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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper explores transitional justice as a way to bring an end to violence and consolidate peace. It 
approaches transitional justice as an expression of the ‘never again’ consensus to prevent or prosecute 
crimes against humanity. It explores transitional justice as an expression of globalizing law and the 
implications this has for the recovery of the ‘rule of law’ and ‘political legitimacy’ in the post conflict 
State. It takes Robert Meister (2002)’s formulation of the politics of victimhood, revenge and 
resentment in the relationship between the beneficiaries and the victims of injustice, as remaining at the 
centre of transitional justice politics in trying to decide on the balance between reconciliation and 
justice projects.  It explores how human rights discourse has been used to de-politicise the ‘victim’ by 
adopting an individually embodied concept of violence as opposed to a structural one. It argues that 
transitional justice as an expression of globalizing law has been primarily directed at maintaining peace 
to achieve closure on past ‘evil’ but that the beneficiary-victim issue has re-emerged in the social 
justice movements and renewed desire for prosecutions. 
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Introduction 
In the post-Cold War era there has been a dramatic expansion in the global ‘rule of law’ to manage 
political conflict and violence through the expansion of the application of international humanitarian 
law and human rights law (Teitel 2002). As well as the expansion of legal institutions courts and laws, 
international law has increased in scope not only regulating relations between States but also regulating 
relations between the individual and State. An important focus of this expanded international law in 
regulating political violence has been the prevention of crimes against humanity. Recent cases of mass 
atrocities – genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, mass disappearance in 
Argentina and Chile – has seen an international consensus forged around ‘never again’ projects to both 
prevent them before they happen (and at the very least to intervene when they break out) and to 
prosecute crimes against humanity after they have happened to uphold international law and justice as a 
deterrence.1 Prevention has been associated with ‘humanitarian intervention’ and prosecution with 
‘transitional justice’, the recovery of the rule of law and State legitimacy and peace-making. Both have 
involved the development of international law to justify intervention in sovereign States to stop 
violence, provide security and re-establish State legal and political legitimacy. 
 
This paper will focus on the role of transitional justice, the legal and conflict resolution strategies 
associated with political transition from periods of mass violence to democracy, in preventing further 
violence and recovering legitimate political and legal authority. It explores the judicialisation of politics 
under transitional justice to bring an end to violence and consolidate peace. The paper takes as its 
starting point Robert Meister (2002)’s proposition of the unresolved relationship between the 
beneficiaries of injustice and the victims of injustice in situations of political conflict. The beneficiary-
victim issue has been at the centre of transitional justice politics in trying to decide on the balance 
between reconciliation and justice projects.  For Meister (2002) the role of human rights in condemning 
the unreconciled victim, what he calls the ‘revolutionary victim’, represents the de-politicising of the 
victim. The paper examines the limits of justice by examining the issue of accountability and State 
legitimacy, and the limits of human rights by looking at reconciliation politics. The paper argues that 
the course of human rights politics associated with transitional justice reveals that the beneficiary-
victim issue remains a central issue and that human rights discourse has been used to promote and 
individually embodied concept of violence as opposed to a structural one.  
 
Transitional justice  
Transitional justice refers to a range of judicial and non-judicial responses to crimes against humanity 
that have occurred as a result of internal political conflict. The primary focus of transitional is the 
global rule of law rooted in the expansion of international law and courts, the consolidation of regional 
human rights courts such as the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the context of the crisis on national sovereignty and 
authority. It promotes strategies to promote reconciliation and justice after mass atrocities. While 
transitional justice is always case-specific, it has established itself as a standard approach for the 
management of political transitions to democracy employing comparative lesson-learning, model 
borrowing as well as the actual recruitment of practitioners/professionals from other conflict settings to 
apply their previous experience.  
 
But while its focus is the global rule of law, transitional justice has become an interdisciplinary field 
encompassing criminology, international law, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, 
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and public health concerned with the intersection of ‘democratization, human rights protections, and 
State reconstruction after conflict’ (McEvoy 2007: 412). The diversity of disciplinary interest reveals 
the competing perspectives on strategies to contain violence, heal victims and bring about social peace 
and the desire for global discourses to frame them. The term transitional justice refers to approaches to 
State accountability and the recognition and compensation of victims during political transitions to 
democracy, with the aim of bringing an end to conflict. Teitel (2003: 69) describes transitional justice 
as a discourse directed at ‘preserving a minimalist rule of law identified with maintaining peace’. 
Transitional justice refers to range of judicial and non-judicial strategies aimed at the rehabilitation of 
divided societies through the accountability to the rule of law and the recovery of the legitimacy of 
State authority and administration (Teitel 2000; Kritz 1995; Elster 2004; Roht-Arriaza & Mariecurrena 
2006). Its core elements have included prosecutions, local truth recovery, criminal justice reform and 
new constitutionalism. While the popular public image of transitional justice has been the role of truth 
commissions in promoting healing through truth and forgiveness in practice it has largely been the 
business of the State concerned with strengthening itself for the delivery of justice and security 
(McEvoy 2007). 
 
There is a great distance between transitional justice as globalizing law and the victims of human rights 
abuse whom the State has failed to protect. The connection between globalizing law and victims occurs 
through the former reaching down or the latter reaching up. Reaching down has taken the form of 
prosecutions in international criminal tribunals and, sometimes, national courts; reaching up has 
involved victims seeking recognition and support to take their claims to transnational human rights 
bodies, usually with the support of human rights lawyers, international NGOs and the global media. 
Reaching involves the legalization of claims and processes. From the top-down perspective of the State 
and its supporting infrastructure, transitional justice is about legal accountability for political crimes, 
law reform and national reconciliation (Clarke et al. 2008). From the bottom-up perspective of victims, 
transitional justice involves the pursuit of claims by victims through ‘injury narratives’ (Engel 2005), 
with the aim of realizing rights allocated to them as citizens. Expressing claims through a rights 
discourse helps to establish a ‘subject position’ as victim, to formulate claims that are based in 
humanity, not just citizenship, and to demand that those in authority be accountable for wrongdoings. 
Since rights claims usually represent a demand for justice where legal remedies are unavailable or 
absent, they signify a broadening of demands beyond the State and its immediate apparatus, to appeal 
to ‘societal accountability’ (Smulovit 2007) by gaining greater visibility through simultaneous 
mobilization (public protest), mediatization (informing and shaping public opinion) and national or 
international legalization (court proceedings). 
 
The emergence of the transitional justice project represents a particular moment in the history of 
citizens’ struggles to realise rights. As Gledhill (2004) points out, corruption and impunity have long 
been the focus of protest in Latin America and did not just arise from recent political transitions to 
democracy after dictatorship (Gledhill 2004). However what is distinctive about this historical moment 
in the struggle for rights is the new relationship of the citizen to globalizing law beyond the State. On 
the one hand, the State becomes a partner in globalizing law through the adoption of transitional justice 
policies; on the other hand, individuals articulate their claims as human rights in transnational legal 
courts, tribunals, international human rights NGOs and in the global media. Teitel (2002: 385) argues 
‘what is new in the notion that law itself can define what constitutes peace and stability internationally, 
and further that it could somehow displace politics to resolve international conflicts.’ 
 5 
‘Transitional justice’ has been a strategy to manage ‘political transition’ which suggests duration, 
process and destination. As a consequence the study of transitional justice has usually been framed as a 
dramatic, temporary and transformative event. It has been conceived as having the structure of a rite of 
passage in which transition is a liminal stage from one social status to another (van Gennep 1977). 
Hence the victim-centred truth commission has frequently been analysed as a dramatic ritual 
(Borneman 1997; Feldman 2002; Humphrey 2002, 2003; Wilson 2001, 2003). However with a longer 
perspective on the outcomes of transitional justice strategies now available – the first truth commission 
was held in Argentina in 1983 (Teitel 2003)2 – the dramatic aspect of transitional justice is better 
understood as a stage in a more protracted process involving ongoing State reconstruction, law reform, 
trust building, reconciliation and justice. The initial period of political transition assumes a different 
significance in the light of the ongoing problems democratizing States have faced in trust in State 
institutions, especially law and policing. Teitel (2003) goes as far as to describe transitional justice as 
having become a normalized condition of global politics expressed in the creation of the permanent 
International Criminal Court to prosecute ‘crimes against humanity as a routine matter under 
international law’ (Teitel 2003: 90). Duffield’s (2001) concept ‘global liberal governance’ – the idea of 
transnationally networked governance through international NGOs, international agencies, business 
and the State to manage failed States - suggests a similar normalisation of the management of conflict 
in the context of diminished sovereignty and the resort to political violence. The protracted character of 
transitional justice points to the difficulty in politically separating off the past and re-establishing State 
legitimacy through legal processes. 
 
law and State legitimacy 
The recovery of the rule of law is a key strategy in transitional justice. However, the proposition that 
the rule of law is able to confer legitimacy on the State has been problematized by anthropologists.  
They have argued that the dominant paradigm of law as rational and neutral is ideological more than 
analytic. The State invokes the authority of law ‘to make things definite within the continuous flow of 
uncertainty by imposing itself from the outside’ (Asad 2004: 287). Legality has assumed a dominant 
role in formulating and thereby giving visibility to what is to be governed and how it is to be governed 
(Rose et al. 2006). But for citizens, for whom the State and law are usually distant and abstract, law 
oscillates between ‘rational’ and ‘magical’ modes (Das 2004). Law as fetishism conjures up the belief 
that legal instruments can produce social harmony, legal language can construct facts and language, 
diversity and difference can be transacted in a universal discourse, and the State can employ law as an 
instrument of governance to represent itself ‘as the custodian of civility against disorder’ (Comaroff & 
Comaroff 2000: 329). This has led anthropologists to argue that sovereignty lies not so much in the 
application of laws and regulations, but in State ritual spectacles and performance (Das 2004; Comaroff 
& Comaroff 2000). The State is brought into being for citizens through a ‘social imaginary’ of it. 
Hence, Comaroff & Comaroff (2000: 529) argue, democratization and the rule of law offer the 
‘magical capacity to promise new beginnings.’ The rule of law is as much about generating order as 
conferring legitimacy on State authority. 
 
However, the recovery of State legitimacy through the ‘rule of law’ is being constrained by the impact 
of globalisation on State sovereignty and the State–citizen relationship (Merry 2006). Gupta & 
Ferguson (2002) have coined the term ‘transnational governmentality’ to describe the extent to which 
States both remain territorially sovereign and inclusive of their populations and incorporated within 
transnational mechanisms of governance. They argue that sovereignty has been displaced upwards and 
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downwards, and that State-like functions are being assumed by supranational bodies and international 
NGOs. Consequently, the State–citizen relationship is being increasingly reconfigured by transnational 
governmentality, with globalizing law mediating the State–citizen relationship. The displacement of 
sovereignty upwards and downwards has served to reinforce the idea of the State/civil society divide, in 
which society is seen as in need of protection from the State as well as legitimating external 
intervention against it. This has become particularly apparent in States that are in crisis, where the 
disarticulation of citizenship and State has produced global networked management of conflict arising 
from international intervention in and support for ‘civil society’, often against the State (Duffield 
2001). The phenomenon of transitional justice is a particular instance of transnational governmentality 
from above, seeking to establish the global rule of law as a decentred source of international authority. 
  
Transitional justice can also be understood as an expression of the globalisation of regulation. The 
regulatory State based on governance through rule regulation first developed in the United States and 
the Europe Union (Shore 2006), and subsequently exported globally. It is characterized by the division 
between State and society, increased delegation, new technologies of regulation, self-regulation in the 
shadow of the State, and the supervision of experts (Levi-Faur 2005). Governance through rule 
regulation has expanded globally to manage different kinds of uncertainty and risk and to promote trust 
and security (Espeland & Vannebo 2007).  Braithwaite (2000) calls this preventive government or 
‘prudentialism’.  Significantly, governance through rule regulation is no longer confined to States but 
has become transnational.  
 
Transitional justice as ‘prudentialism’ represents not so much the recovery of sovereignty but a strategy 
for global risk management of political conflict through the judicialization of international relations. 
International law is used to manage risk, promote trust, and make authority legible. Teitel (2002) 
argues the present expansion of international law represents a ‘new international legalism’, which has 
emerged from the greater institutionalization of international law and the weakened State, especially 
transitional ones. Justice beyond the State draws upon transnational law from above and on the 
promotion of programmes of local community restorative justice from below. In the language of the 
regulatory State, reliance is on local risk management through ‘self-regulation among communities of 
shared fate’ (Braithwaite 2000).  
 
Human rights discourse and victimhood 
Transitional justice is an expression of attempts to achieve the global regulation of political violence, 
especially the prevention of and protection against crimes against humanity (Teitel 2003). It is the most 
recent ‘never again’ project – the historical attempts to stop atrocities happening - focused on the 
protection of victims of gross human right violations.  This global politics of human rights is based on a 
growing international consensus to prevent atrocities as an ‘incontestable evil’ (Meister 2005: 1). From 
the top-down perspective transitional justice has been about the recovery of the rule of law and State 
legitimacy, from the bottom up the realization of the human rights of victims.  
 
At the centre of this human rights discourse is the suffering victim. However this ‘victim’ is not merely 
a bearer of unrealized rights but also viewed as a political agent potentially motivated by the politics of 
revenge or resentment towards the perpetrators and the beneficiaries of past injustice. These feelings 
constitute an individually embodied violence that needs to be managed in order to prevent further 
violence. The politics of transitional justice, Meister (2002) argues, has involved de-politicising the 
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victim. In the politics of victimhood the victim is faced with a choice about ‘what to do with their grief: 
should it be harnessed as the politics of grievance or suppressed as the politics of resentment?’ (Mesiter 
2002: 93). The project of liberal transitional justice has been to distinguish between perpetrators and 
beneficiaries of injustice by individualising crimes and then to reconcile the beneficiaries of past 
injustice and victims of past injustice by producing a consensus that the ‘evil’ is in the past. The thrust 
of this strategy is based on stopping the victims of injustice continuing to think of themselves as 
victims. This effectively splits the ‘evil’ of the past regime into the innocent and the guilty, the 
beneficiaries of ‘evil’ and victims of ‘evil’ on the one hand and the perpetrators of ‘evil’. 
  
For Meister (2002) transitional justice continues the earlier twentieth century revolutionary and 
counter-revolutionary perspectives on the victim and victimhood in these internal political conflicts. 
The revolutionary perspective saw 'social suffering and the struggle to overcome it' as virtuous. In other 
words, the revolutionary project continues after victory through ongoing efforts to deny beneficiaries of 
past injustice the right to retain those benefits. By contrast, the counter-revolutionary perspective was 
defined by the fear 'that these victorious victims would come to exercise a militant and punitive form of 
rule’ (Meister 2002: 93). They believe the beneficiary-victim relationship engendered a morally 
damaging victimhood, which would not allow for reconciliation. The challenge of transitional justice 
has been conceived of as balance, something ‘if practiced in just the right amount, and with just the 
right degree of restraint, can bring about a cultural transformation that will leave liberal democracy 
secure’ (Meister 2002: 94). This calibrated justice has been at the heart of reconciliation politics in 
which the beneficiaries and victims are the central players and partners.  
 
Even where trials and truth commissions have appeared to be successful transitional justice has 
effectively reinstated the counter-revolutionary project – it reassigns ‘political responsibility for past 
injustice from the larger collectivities that benefited to the individuals who implemented the old 
regime’s policies’ (Meister 2002: 94). This distinction between perpetrator and beneficiary is presented 
as being required by the ‘rule of law’. What it offers the victims is a moral victory based on their ability 
to reconcile with the beneficiaries of past injustice. By being able to put their victimhood in the past 
they appear as ‘undamaged’ victims – i.e. not wanting to continue to seek revenge beneficiaries of past 
injustice. The beneficiaries (the counter-revolutionaries) are thereby reassured that the victims are 
‘morally undamaged (“they didn’t hate us after all”) that there is no longer a reason to condone, or 
deny, past acts of repression’ (Meister 2002: 94). 
 
In South Africa the role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was to define how the evil of 
apartheid had been morally defeated. ‘The past suffering of victims could be honoured as a claim to 
moral victory precisely insofar as they were willing to accept moral victory as victory enough, and to 
forego the demands of revolutionary justice’ (Meister 2002: 95). In human rights discourse distributive 
justice has been off the agenda except as ‘reparation’, which has usually consisted of symbolic 
acknowledgement more than remedies for past suffering. Certainly restorative justice in which 
perpetrators contributed to undoing the harm they had caused has not been seriously canvassed. The 
objective of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC) was effectively to ‘de-
politicise the unresolved victim-beneficiary issue’ and represent it as ‘superseded by a moral consensus 
on the means used to resolve them: violent or non-violent, constitutional or “terrorist”’ (Meister 2002: 
95). The construction of ‘evil’ (the evil of apartheid) as something that can be put in the past also 
reinforces this de-politicising of the victim. Thus ‘unreconciled victims who continue to demand 
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redistribution at the expense of beneficiaries will be accused of undermining the consensus that the evil 
is past; it also means that continuing beneficiaries who act on their fears that victims are still 
unreconciled will be accused of undermining the consensus that the past was evil by “blaming the 
victim”’ ((Meister 2002: 96). Moreover the politics promoted – human rights culture, civic activism – 
is conceived as preventing ‘past evil’ from returning. Yet the litigation initiated by the South African 
Kulumani Victim Support Group in New York in 2002 reveals the disturbance unreconciled victims 
can produce for the post-apartheid, post-reconciliation State. Kulumani filed claims under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act against corporations who they allege aided and abetted the apartheid State. The ANC 
government’s response was to oppose the legal actions as a threat to the national economy and 
undermining the good relationship they had established with global corporations (Bond 2008). 
 
The social justice orientation of contemporary post-apartheid human rights politics reveals how in fact 
the beneficiary-victim issue remains unresolved, despite the rhetoric of closure on the past. The 
enormous expansion of human rights activities in post-apartheid South Africa, and in fact in may post-
transition States, is a response to the legacy of structural inequality produced under apartheid and the 
new neo-liberal democratic compact between the State and international business undermining any 
prospective to recover a redistributive developmental State (Humphrey & Valverde 2008). This 
represents a combined protest that the evil of apartheid (at least its consequences) is not in the past and 
that redistribution was the expectation of the victims (of the system of apartheid) in the post-apartheid 
State. Perhaps the victims did not really grasp that the consensus forged on the moral meaning of the 
past through the TRC came at the cost of forfeiting future claims. 
 
Conclusion 
Transitional justice is an expression of the judicialisation of international relations which has both 
prevention and prosecution aims. It represents the promotion of the global ‘rule of law’ in the 
management and regulation of political conflict and violence. Thus international humanitarian and 
human rights law has been instrumental in forging the international consensus around the prevention of 
crimes against humanity, the latest expression of which is the R2P (“responsibility to protect”). The 
role of human rights politics has been vital in making visible crimes against humanity and putting 
pressure on governments to be made accountable for their actions. However the use of human rights 
discourse in constructing claims and framing the subject position of victim in the transitional justice 
project has resulted in the victim being redeemed for a new moral consensus to permit political 
compromise. As Meister (2002: 95) argues, human rights discourse has shifted from ‘an aspirational 
ideal to an implicit compromise’ in which victims of past injustice are offered ‘a moral victory on the 
understanding that the ongoing beneficiaries get to keep their gains without fear of “terrorism”.’ 
 
Two issues have surfaced in post-mass violence societies, which might suggest transitional justice is a 
tactic of the State, a ritual performance to enact new beginnings, rather than an actual closure of the 
evil past. These are the rapid expansion of human rights politics in the direction of social justice issues 
and the ongoing demands for accountability and the new prosecutions of perpetrators in those States 
that had closed the investigation of the past through amnesty laws. In other words, the beneficiary-
victim issue has only been temporarily de-politicised through transitional justice strategies because of 
the legal focus on the perpetrator-victim relationship. 
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Notes 
1 While crimes against humanity are commonly associated with transitional justice, R2P crimes also 
include genocide and war crimes, each with distinct legal definitions in the Rome Statute. 
2 The Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP) was not called a ‘truth 
commission’ nor was its aim to promote reconciliation. 
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